Las implicaciones del procedimiento de la vía rápida en el Congreso de Estados Unidos para la integración de las Américas

Abstract

The present article effects an analysis of the obstacles imposed by the United States Congress on the trade policy of President George Bush with reference to negotiating new agreements to establish free trade areas with the country’s main trading partners. The article seeks to explain how internal differences regarding trade liberalization were resolved by President George Bush through specific concessions to certain congressmen, and thus addresses the process of internal negotiation between the executive and legislative branches of the US government during the passing of Fast–Track in 2001–2002. The paper also analyzes previous negotiations for the signing of agreements between the United States and Israel, and with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) so as to highlight the protectionist tendency of the US Congress and the increasingly important concessions that the executive branch has to make in order to obtain the authorization of the legislative branch in negotiations with other countries.