Provision of local public goods: the cases of Mexico (2009-2012) and Costa Rica (2006-2014)

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18504/pl3161-011-2023

Keywords:

Political parties, local public goods, median voter, electoral system, legislative behavior

Abstract

What explains that legislators present legislative instruments in order to distribute local public goods in their electoral districts? Previous literature on political representation in legislatures has focused on understanding policy making (Harden, 2013). However, a gap persists in detailing whether they focus on distributing local public goods. It is argued that, in contexts with strong party leadership, leaders are interested in distributing local public goods and seek to satisfy the preferences of the median voter, especially in two conditions: single-member districts and cosponsor ship. The cases of Costa Rica and Mexico are studied, and estimating a regression model the hypotheses are confirmed.

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Author Biography

Mónica Lara Escalante, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas

Doctora en Ciencia Política por el Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas. Asistente de docencia del Laboratorio de Métodos de la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Sede México (Flacso México) 

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Published

2023-01-01

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Lara Escalante, M. . (2023). Provision of local public goods: the cases of Mexico (2009-2012) and Costa Rica (2006-2014). Perfiles Latinoamericanos, 31(61). https://doi.org/10.18504/pl3161-011-2023

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