Distribución de bienes públicos locales: los casos de México (2009-2012) y Costa Rica (2006-2014)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18504/pl3161-011-2023Palabras clave:
Partidos políticos, bienes públicos locales, votante mediano, sistema electoral, comportamiento legislativoResumen
¿Qué explica que los legisladores presenten instrumentos legislativos con el fin de distribuir bienes públicos locales en sus distritos electorales? Literatura previa sobre representación política en las legislaturas se ha enfocado en entender la elaboración de políticas (Harden, 2013). Sin embargo, persiste un vacío en detallar si se enfocan en distribuir bienes públicos locales. En este artículo se argumenta que, en contextos con liderazgos partidarios fuertes, a la clase dirigente de los partidos políticos le interesa distribuir bienes públicos locales y busca satisfacer las preferencias del votante mediano, sobre todo en dos condiciones: distritos uninominales y coautoría. Se estudian los casos de Costa Rica y México; y estimando un modelo de regresión se confirman las hipótesis.
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